Abstract: Fatigue is an increasingly recognised risk factor for transportation accidents. In light of this, there is the question of whether driving whilst fatigued should be a criminal offence. This paper discusses the current legal position, including the problems of voluntary conduct and self awareness. Three models for reform are proposed. The manner in which scientific research can inform legal consideration and future directions for research are discussed.
Introduction
Fatigue is increasingly being recognised as a serious contributor to road accidents worldwide 1, 2) . Fatigue is a broad term used to describe both physical and mental symptoms. It is caused by a number of factors, including disruption to sleep and circadian rhythms, physical or psychological illness, prolonged or excessive physical or mental workload, and environmental factors. In the context of the current paper, fatigue refers to sleepiness induced by either sleep loss or by the circadian variation in sleep propensity.
Governments are responding to this issue by tightening regulations for commercial drivers and improving the road environment with fatigue in mind. For example they are introducing rumble strips and constructing appropriately designed truck stops, and engaging in education campaigns for the general motoring public (see for example, the "Think" campaign in the United Kingdom). However after a serious road crash, especially one involving a fatality, there is also the question of whether the driver should be prosecuted under the criminal law.
Given that there is such a high recorded incidence of fatigue related road crashes in the industrialised world, one might expect a considerable body of law devoted to the topic (see reviews 3, 4) ). However, this is not the situation, and there are few reported decisions available. One possible reason for this is that fatigue has only relatively recently been acknowledged as a risk factor on the roads, and is slowly entering into the day to day considerations of those responsible for road safety prosecutions (usually the police and public prosecutors). Therefore, the fatigue related component of the accident may not be emphasised in any reporting 5) . However it is unlikely that this explanation entirely accounts for the dearth of prosecutions. Another potential reason that prosecutions may not be launched, or that the fatigue element is not emphasised, may be due to the confusion that courts display when confronted with issues surrounding fatigue such as voluntariness and automatism. This paper will discuss the limitations of current systems and present alternative models as potential solutions.
Fatigue and the Criminal Law
In most countries there are no specific prohibitions against fatigued driving, but a typical fatigue related accident can be prosecuted under more general criminal laws. These laws are usually expressed as prohibitions against 'culpable driving' (New South Wales, Australia), 'causing death by dangerous driving' (South Australia and The United Kingdom), 'dangerous driving' (Canada), 'homicide by vehicle' (Pennsylvania, USA) or other similarly worded offences. Currently, there is only one jurisdiction worldwide that lists driving whilst fatigued as a criminal offence, the State of New Jersey, in the United States of America. The statute, adopted in 2004, makes it an offence for a person to drive if they have not slept in the previous 24 h 6) . The law can be invoked when: 1. a death is caused in the crash, and 2. the accident involves a motor vehicle.
If found guilty of this offense, the driver is likely to be given a stiff penalty. At the time of writing, there are no reported cases that have been brought under this legislation, so its effectiveness is unknown. Apart from New Jersey, Governmental consideration in making driving whilst fatigued a crime has been expressed elsewhere, as for example, in Australia a recommendation was made that fatigued driving become an offense although the Government subsequently rejected the proposal 7, 8) . Nevertheless, fatigued driving can be prosecuted (with difficulty) as occurred in the highly publicised example of R v Gary Neil Hart 9) (The "Selby" case). The defendant, Mr Hart, was successfully prosecuted for 10 counts of causing death by dangerous driving under section 40 of the Road Traffic Act, 1991 (UK). The facts of the case were that Mr Hart drove off a motorway and onto a section of the main north-south high speed railway track in the United Kingdom near the town of Selby in Yorkshire. He was unable to remove his car or warn emergency authorities before the morning Newcastle-London express train collided with the car. The train was consequently derailed and approximately 1.5 km down the track collided with an oncoming coal train. Ten people died as a result of the crash and 94 were injured. Mr Hart was sentenced to five years prison and had his license disqualified for five years. The trial judge in the case (Macky J) commented, "[this is] perhaps the worst driving-related incident in the UK in recent years".
The framework for prosecuting a fatigue related crash
Scenario 1 presents a typical scenario in which a driver could be prosecuted for a fatigue related driving crash. The following sections explain Fig. 1 which illustrates how the facts presented in Scenario 1 would be addressed in a court. In Fig. 1 , there are three questions that have to be answered positively for a conviction to occur. Firstly, there has to be a law that the driver can be charged with, as discussed above. Secondly, the prosecuting authorities have to show that the driver did the acts (i.e. driving the truck and crashing it) voluntarily, and thirdly they also have to show that the acts were done either intentionally or with reckless indifference to the consequences. It should be noted that Fig. 1 represents a stylized model of the approach typical to common law countries and that there will be differences between jurisdictions.
In this imaginary scenario, a truck driver goes to bed on Monday morning at 1 am before awakening at 6am, thereby achieving 5 h sleep. He spends the remainder of the day with his family before commencing to drive at 6pm on the Monday. At 6am the following morning (Tuesday) he fails to negotiate a turn in the road and runs into a pedestrian, killing them. The most likely explanation is that the driver fell asleep at some point prior to entering the bend. In this scenario, it can be seen that the truck driver has had zero hours sleep in the prior 24 h to the crash, and in the prior 48 h to the crash he had achieved 5 h sleep. 
Prosecution decision
The first Question in Fig. 1 (in the grey box) is whether the driver should be prosecuted in the circumstances. In relation to Scenario 1, this would rest on a judgment of the evidence available and the benefit to the community of such a prosecution. However, behind this question lies the more general issue of whether driving while fatigued should be punished at all. Laboratory studies have shown that increases in fatigue are associated with lapses in performance, general cognitive slowing, including a lowering of optimum performance capabilities, memory problems, and an increasing inability to maintain the vigilance required to perform effectively (reviewed 10) ). Simulator studies have replicated these findings in tasks that are more like real world tasks. Thus, increased lane drift 11) , 'off road incidents' 12) and 'erratic' flying behaviour 13) have been observed with increasing levels of fatigue.
Furthermore, increased fatigue has been linked to an increase in road crashes and fatalities, with different sources concluding that that is a significant contributor to transportation incidents and accidents 1, [14] [15] [16] . In the United States, the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) 17) has estimated that approximately 21% of road accidents could be linked to fatigue. Similar figures have been estimated in Australia 15) and the UK 18) . Finally, research has also indicated that the performance decrements associated with sleep deprivation can be equated to those of alcohol [19] [20] [21] . Therefore, a strong case can be made from a public safety perspective that driving whilst fatigued should be an offence.
However, when considering whether to make fatigued driving an offence, a related question is that of self inducement of impairment. It is generally accepted that if the individual administers (or forgets to administer) an agent that alters their capacity to respond appropriately to their environment, the resulting impairment should not be able to be invoked as a defense. For example, somebody who knowingly drinks alcohol or takes a drug cannot claim that they lacked awareness of their actions due to the action of the drug. Conversely, the innocent who has their drink spiked, or succumbs to an epileptic attack without any warning is excused from their actions. Fatigue is a condition that lies half way between these two extremes. In one sense it is self administered, as every person knows that as they stay awake they become more tired and eventually fall asleep. On the other hand, there are many impositions in daily life such as work, commuting and family responsibilities, that make it so that we are not fully in control of the amount of time that we are awake or asleep. Any law that is created should be able to take this issue into account, if necessary by making it illegal to require someone who is too fatigued to drive.
Actus reus
Once it is determined that a prosecution should proceed, the next issue according to Fig. 1 is to decide whether the action was voluntary. One of the fundamental doctrines of the criminal law is that a defendant (in this case, the driver) must act voluntarily to be convicted of a crime [22] [23] [24] [25] . This voluntary act requirement has traditionally been encompassed by the term actus reus. The term "voluntarily" has a special meaning the courts where it means that the person is engaged in some form of active control of the car. Conversely, if a driver falls asleep they are acting involuntarily. Involuntariness and automatism are often used as synonyms, but this definition has been questioned, so the more general term of involuntariness will be used. Thus, proof that the driver in Scenario 1 was asleep at the time of a crash is evidence of an involuntary act, and is prima facie exculpatory.
Mens rea
In conjunction with the actus reus voluntary act requirement, most serious crimes (such as those that carry a possible jail term) also require a fault, or mental element known as the mens rea. This element requires that the person intended their actions, or that they were reckless to the consequences of their actions (see "C" in Fig. 1 ). In addition to potentially negating the voluntary element ("B" in Fig.  1 ), fatigue could also negate the mental element. Taking the example presented in Scenario 1, if it can be shown that the driver was awake at the time of the crash, and he was aware of the consequences of his actions (mens rea) he could be found guilty. However, if the driver could show either of these elements ("B" or "C") were lacking he could not be found guilty. In the context of mens rea, if the driver could show that it was reasonable that he did not think that he would fall asleep he would be able to defeat the imputation of recklessness.
Negation of the mens rea question is normally considered in terms of mental capacity or insanity which is not applicable in the scenario considered. However, the general rule stands that if a person had no idea that they were going to fall asleep or that they were becoming so drowsy that they were dangerous on the road, they should be excused from responsibility for their actions. This is a difficult area of proof, as usually the only person present in these situations is the driver themselves and it is in their own interests to testify that they had no premonition of tiredness. It is in addressing this question that scientific research can have an important impact, by assessing how well people can assess their impairment, what factors they take into account in doing so, and how well they can use this information to engage in appropriate behaviours. Research has shown that for situations involving a single period of acute sleep deprivation using laboratory tasks individuals have an accurate perception of their performance 26, 27) . However, during simulated night shift work, the ability to predict performance was moderate at best 28) . In a simulated driving experiment, Horne and Reyner 29) found that while individuals may not be able to predict when they are about to fall asleep or report that they have fallen asleep, they consistently report the awareness of fighting sleep before they are objectively judged to have fallen asleep. The authors postulate that there are two reasons for this. The first is that sleep onset may be more rapid than people realise and secondly that the state of being sleepy interferes with the metacognitive ability to introspect about sleepiness. Nevertheless, even if people are not very good at predicting if they are about to fall asleep, research indicates that individuals can accurately assess how many hours of sleep that they have had in the last 24 or 48 h 30, 31) , and this information may provide a basis for assessing whether the decision to drive was reasonable. These conclusions, while providing plausible hypotheses, are largely only supported by a limited number of studies and need to be more thoroughly investigated by further research. In particular, there is a question about whether the results obtained in the laboratory are generalisable to the fatigued driver, as most of the studies involve single periods of sleep deprivation, whereas a typical fatigued driver would have either have had some sleep or experienced a series of less than optimal sleep opportunities over the prior few days. Furthermore, the simulator studies have only been conducted with a limited number of male participants.
Overall, the whole process described in Fig. 1 highlights the tendency that the criminal law to ask questions that are capable of discrete, binary categories. However, this does not accord with current scientific thinking. As some judges and legal scholars have noted (e.g. McHugh J [32] [33] [34] [35] ) "consciousness is not like light that is on or off" and likewise the line between wake and sleep is blurry. Although there will always be line drawing dilemmas in the law, it should be a goal that the lines should be established based on the most scientific and objective basis that is possible.
Temporal association
A feature of the criminal law is that it assumes that the actus reus and the mens rea occur approximately simultaneously. Thus to commit a murder by shooting someone, the pulling of the trigger must be accompanied at that point in time by a desire to kill. Therefore in Scenario 1 the argument could be raised that as the crash occurred after the driver fell asleep, the behavior was involuntary, negating the actus reus requirement (see Fig. 1 "A") . However, some courts have not allowed this argument to succeed and, using a curious form of backward logic that has been called the prior fault principle, have found defendants guilty (see the top Panel of Fig. 2) 37) ). In the top panel of Fig. 2 , the bottom line represents the increase in fatigue level with time. The prior fault principle will means that the court will look back in time (the dotted line) to a period before the crash, and before falling asleep, to find the required voluntary conduct.
There are two major theoretical difficulties with this principle [37] [38] [39] [40] . The first, as explained above, is that the traditional requirement of the criminal law is that the actus reus and the mens rea are contemporaneous. When the prior fault principle is applied, the mental state is "spread out" over a period of time as a method for establishing liability. It is unclear from the case law how long this stretching is possible, for it may be that the last point in time that it can be established that driving was voluntary was a long time and distance from the site of the instance of the unsafe driving (or in the case of Scenario 1, the crash). The second difficulty with the prior fault principle is the question of whether the act (of fatigued driving) can be said to have caused the dangerous driving or accident. In some cases this is not a problem as the offence is the act of dangerous driving itself, but in other cases the requirement is for dangerous driving causing death. In this situation, the dangerous driving must be the causative factor of the death. However, as in Scenario 1, the car was not being dangerously driven at the time of death (as there was a lack of voluntary conduct). However at the earlier point in time when the car was being driven dangerously no one had been hit.
Critics of the prior fault principle have questioned why the process of falling asleep is the focus, when driving whilst sleepy is also clearly dangerous in and of itself. As commented by Leader-Elliot 40) The offence [ Or, to put it succinctly, "the offence of dangerous driving is complete where a driver continues to drive while feeling drowsy whether or not they lapse into a state of unconsciousness" 37) . These criticisms will be addressed in formulating suggestions for the reform of the criminal law below.
A Way Forward?
It is contended that there is a need for reform so that driving while fatigued is a separate offence, but which avoids the difficulties discussed above. This paper will now turn to consider three potential models for a new regime that could address this issue. Fig. 2 presents a "semi-voluntary" model that would address those who could show that they were impaired by fatigue, but still awake, in a different way to those who were fully awake.
One potential model for drafting a law is to state that driving a vehicle whilst fatigued is an explicit offence. This would remove the necessity of trying someone under a general law and allow the issues surrounding fatigue to be considered in their own framework. This first model has the advantage of being a simple and uncomplicated directive, a feature that is desirable in any law. It has the additional advantage of making the act of fatigued driving an explicit offence, rather than an implicit offence as it is currently. This proposal would not require any amendment to the current model as described by the top panel Fig. 2 , but it would remove the need for prior fault inquiries. To compare Model 1 with a more familiar example, alcohol, this proposal would be the same as a general prohibition against driving whilst intoxicated. However, the primary difficulty with Model 1 is that it does not specify how fatigued is "too fatigued". A possible solution to this is to copy the approach of the New Jersey legislature by defining "too fatigued" in terms of hours without sleep. However, the New Jersey approach has its limitations, as both in terms of the substance of the prohibition (it only applies when no sleep has occurred in the prior 24 h) and scope (vehicular fatalities) this law may fail to include in its ambit individuals that it was intended to cover. Thus a person who has 2 h of sleep in the prior 24 would not be covered by the law, and neither would the driver who causes serious injury but not death. Furthermore it overlooks the difficulty that individuals have when measuring their objective performance when fatigued [26] [27] [28] [29] giving rise to potential complaints that people would not have a fair opportunity to comply with a law drafted in this manner (See 41) for a discussion of the application of the fair opportunity principle to involuntariness).
The second model, illustrated in the middle panel of Fig.  2 , flows from the limitations of the first model. This model would involve the creation of a "bright line" offence, so that driving while fatigued over a certain level becomes the offence. This has a direct conceptual parallel to current drink driving statues. The advantage of this kind of model is that it removes the "How tired is too tired" problem, as the level of fatigue has been decided by the legislature and informed by science (e.g. by calculation of risk likelihoods at certain levels of fatigue). Furthermore, there is the advantage in this kind of approach as a government can legislate for different levels of punishment that corresponds to the level of fatigue. So for example, a fatigue level that involves twice the risk of an accident will have a penalty set at one level, and a fatigue level that involves four times the risk would have a penalty set at a higher level. In Fig. 2 , this would mean that as a driver moved to the right with increasing fatigue, they would be punished more severely. A further advantage of the bright line model of offence is that it not only removes some of the voluntariness questions in the same way as the first model does (by removing the need for prior fault inquiries), but it also addresses questions of intention. This is because a "bright line" does not require proof of intention (or recklessness). To give a familiar example, to be prosecuted for drink driving does not require that you were aware that your blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was above the limit, only that you were driving with a BAC above the limit.
The primary difficulty with this model is the question of defining and measuring fatigue (this is also an issue for the first model). Unlike alcohol, which has a measurable concentration in the bloodstream that correlates to performance impairment, fatigue is a constructed concept that has no physical manifestation in human physiology of which we are currently aware. If this model were to be implemented, there would be the need for the scientific community to develop a suitable, easy to administer and reliable test for this purpose. Development of tests using different concepts (e.g. reaction time 42) , statistical modeling 43) or physiological parameters 44) ) has begun, although their robustness is still questionable in an operational setting.
A third possible structure for a fatigue related law is to adopt for fatigued driving a version of the suggestion of McSherry 33) and Denno 34, 35) whose work focuses on voluntariness and insanity and such medical conditions as epilepsy. They propose the creation of an intermediate category of awareness, between voluntary and involuntary, and between intended and unintended. This would capture the semi-conscious nature of fatigued driving. This alternative model is displayed in the bottom panel of Fig. 2 , where the spectrum of alertness is divided into three categories (voluntary/alert, "semi-voluntary" and involuntary), rather than the traditional two categories of voluntary and involuntary as currently exists (see the top panel of Fig. 2) . If a third category of semi-voluntary (or semi-conscious) were to exist, it would be possible to treat a defendant in a more flexible fashion than currently, particularly when a successful involuntary/automaton defense leads to a total acquittal, and an unsuccessful invocation could lead to a long term of incarceration. However, an intermediate category such as proposed would be difficult to implement in practical terms. As with the other models, the boundaries of the new category would be a source of argument and confusion, unless very carefully drafted. Careful thought would also have to be given to the sentencing options of a person that successfully raises a semiconsciousness argument. Although the categorisation of somebody into this class means they are granted a lessening of responsibility for their actions, this should not mean that they will simply receive a lower sentence, rather that they should receive a different type of sentence. It would appear that a third category would involve a radical shake up of traditional criminal concepts, but not necessarily solve any of the problems surrounding fatigued driving that could not be solved by the application of models 1 or 2, and appropriate sentencing options. It may be that fatigue, although it concerns issues of semi-voluntariness, is in another category to other forms of less than full control as discussed by McSherry and Denno, and their solutions are not appropriate.
Conclusion
There are strong arguments for making an offence of fatigued driving from a road safety perspective. While it is true that in most circumstances there are already laws in place that could address the issue, the lack of prosecutions would seem to indicate that they are not effective and that more specific laws need to be introduced. There are a number of social, scientific and technical issues that require consideration when drafting such a law to ensure that it is effective and just.
There are three models of laws that can be considered for fatigued driving, should a government decide to change the law from its present state. The first is an offense of general nature, as described in the top panel of Fig. 2 , in which fatigued driving is confirmed as an offence. The second alternative, as outlined in the middle panel of Fig. 2 is a "bright line" offense, similar in style to current drink driving legislation in many countries. The third alternative involves the introduction of a new category of semi-voluntary conduct under which all fatigued driving cases would fall. The first model does little more than clarify the current situation and can be viewed as a minimalist solution that may remove some of the difficulties associated with the current laws.
The third model proposes a significant restructuring of the criminal law that may be more than is necessary to achieve the goals of the endeavour. However, as this model was adapted from proposals in non-fatigue related areas, if the law were to be changed with those areas in mind, fatigued driving would be able to fit neatly within the new structure. Model 2 is the preferred approach, as it allows a scientifically informed, risk based "bright line" to be developed, and furthermore it eliminates the need for the prior fault type of analysis.
Fruitful scientific research could be undertaken to assist any reforms to the law. Further examination of the nature of and capacity that people have to assess their risk and performance when fatigued could assist in determining questions of reasonableness which would still be at issue if no change occurred or Model 1 is adopted. Another profitable line of research would be into the quantification of the risks of fatigue and its measurement, so that if bright line offences were created (Model 2), there would be an objective measure of where to place the lines and how to assess whether a person had crossed them or not.
These legal reforms conducted with the rigour of scientific support could assist in the improvement of safety on the roads.
